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Abstract
This paper proposes a model encompassing alternative views of
contagion by highlighting the di®erent channels of transmission of ¯-
nancial crises in an unifying framework. We study investor behaviour
when they are a®ected by external habit formation. It is shown how in-
ternational portfolio choice in frictionless ¯nancial markets with habit
formation is in itself a channel of contagion. The possible stabilization
e®ects of capital controls and Tobin tax on the international transmis-
sion of ¯nancial crises are also discussed.
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11 Introduction
One of the main features of the ¯nancial crises of the nineties was their ten-
dency to spread across countries. The Mexican devaluation of 1994 a®ected
other Latin American countries (the Tequila e®ect); the currency crisis in
Thailand of July 1997 spread across East Asia; several months after the Rus-
sian crisis of August 1998, the Brazilian crisis ended up with the °oatation
of Real.
Most of these crises seemed to be regional, with the notable exception
of the Russian one, which spread far away, a®ecting economies with scant
fundamental economic links with the origin country. In the last decade, a
growing body of literature has tackled this problem of contagion or trans-
mission of ¯nancial crises, with a propensity to split the explanations of
contagion between causes related to real and ¯nancial links, called \funda-
mental based contagion" by Calvo and Reinhart (1996), and contagion due to
the investors' behaviour. Glick and Rose (1999), for example, ¯nd that trade
patterns and competitiveness on third markets can be the rationale for con-
tagion and its regional character. On the other hand, an increasing number
of empirical studies have shown that this neat distinction can be misleading.
Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) show that it is hard to distinguish between
trade and ¯nancial links. Nonetheless, they ¯nd that the role of ¯nancial
linkages among countries is crucial to understand the regional attribute of
the Asian crisis of 1997 and the Latin American troubles of 1994-95. These
authors emphasize the regional nature of ¯nancial arrangements needed to
facilitate trade, mainly through commercial banks. In both the Latin Amer-
ican and the Asian crises, almost all the countries involved where heavily
indebted towards clusters of commercial banks, Japanese in the case of the
Asian countries, and American in the case of the Latin American countries.
In other words, regional trade blocs depended on common lenders, thus be-
coming regional ¯nancial blocs. In this context, if a bank faces increasing
non-performing loans in one country, it will likely withdraw money (or not
rollover existing credit) from other countries in the same ¯nancial bloc to try
to reduce its overall risk. This can happen as a result of the necessity to ad-
just its lending accordingly to its lower level of wealth. All this can make the
case for cross country spill-overs determined by wealth e®ects. Eichengreen
et al. (2001) reach the same conclusion through a disaggregated analysis of
the volumes, spreads and maturities of emerging-markets sovereign bonds.
They ¯nd ample evidence that adverse shifts in ¯nancial markets sentiment
2or °ight to quality took place within the respective regions after the crises in
Mexico and Asia. In the Russian crisis of 1998 the turmoil was not restricted
within a same regional or ¯nancial bloc, but rather spread across countries,
like Brazil, with small direct economic connections to Russia. Baig and Gold-
fajn (2001) ¯nd empirical support to the hypothesis of contagion through
¯nancial links. The high correlation of sovereign bond spreads during the
crisis, in fact, suggests that foreign investors panicked for the Russian crisis
and thus played a crucial role in the transmission of the crisis, adding to the
pressure exerted by domestic savers and investors on the Brazilian ¯nancial
markets.
With both types of causes, i.e. fundamental based and investors based,
contagion can arise because of, or can be exacerbated by, self ful¯lling beliefs
of the private agents: crises spread just because agents believe they are going
to spread. As reported above, Eichengreen et al. (2001) note that a change
in investors' sentiment has been crucial in determining the spread of crises
in all the major episodes of the 1990s. Park and Song (2001), as well, argue
that foreign investors were responsible for deepening the crisis in Korea fol-
lowing the meltdown of the other East Asian countries by overreacting to the
deterioration in the ¯nancial conditions of corporations and ¯nancial institu-
tions. Masson (1999), extending a model introduced by Jeanne (1997), shows
that a second generation model of speculative attacks can generate multiple
equilibria as a consequence of the interaction between the government and
the private sector, with contagion e®ects emerging as the expectations of de-
valuation of the currency of a competitor country enter the model. On the
other hand, Goldstein and Pauzner (1999) demonstrate that the strategic in-
teraction of investors holding equities of two di®erent countries can generate
multiple equilibria and contagious withdrawal of money from one country.
This is the result of the expectations about the other investors' behaviour,
analogous to what happens in the Dybvig and Diamond (1983) model of bank
runs.
This suggests that a theoretical model of contagion should be able to
account simultaneously for transmission mechanisms based on trade and ¯-
nancial links as well as on the investors' behaviour and sentiment shifting.
This paper contributes to the knowledge of the mechanisms driving con-
tagion in the context of a unifying macroeconomic framework analyzing fun-
damentals spill-overs as well as portfolio management considerations of in-
ternational investors as causes of crises' spread. It highlights the role of
capital °ows in transmission of ¯nancial crises by studying the decisions of
3international investors, and pointing out that portfolio choices can in them-
selves be an important source of spread of crises. In our model, investor
behaviour is a®ected by (a slow moving) habit time-varying subsistence level
(see Abel (1990), Campbell and Cochrane (1999)). It is an external habit
based on aggregate consumption rather than an internal habit based on past
own consumption (see Constanides (1990), and Sundaresan (1989)). We fol-
low the Campbell-Cochrane (1999) speci¯cation of external habit formation.
The key insight of this model which they use to explain the equity premium
puzzle, is that as investor wealth falls, the e®ective curvature of the utility
function increases making the investors act as if they are more risk averse.
This increases the risk premium that investors need to hold the risky assets.
This is the mechanism through which ¯nancial linkages can act as an inde-
pendent source of transmission of ¯nancial crisis. If there is a ¯nancial crises
in one country if the wealth of the investors decreases su±ciently, then they
will demand higher risk premia to hold risky assets of other countries even
when there is no change in the fundamentals of these countries. This will
increase the coverage ratio and make debt servicing more di±cult and can
act as a trigger for a ¯nancial crises. If the investors do not act as price takers
they will recognize this and this will add an additional element of feedback
in increasing the risk premia. In the current model we treat the investors as
price takers and thus do not model this additional feedback e®ect. For this
mechanism to be operative some conditions should be satis¯ed. Firstly, the
portfolios of the investors should not be completely diversi¯ed so that the
crisis in the ¯rst country has only an in¯nitesimal impact on their wealth.
One implication of this is that the portfolios of investors should contain sig-
ni¯cant holdings of assets of the country which ¯rst experiences the crisis.
Thus, this will also explain why some ¯nancial crises are not transmitted -
they are fully absorbed by the investors. Secondly, the investors should be
large or have large holdings of assets in the country where the ¯nancial crises
is transmitted to. Otherwise, the increase in risk premia demanded will have
minimal impact on other countries. Thus, understanding the pattern of port-
folio holdings can give strong insights in to where ¯nancial crises are likely
to spread through the wealth e®ects.
It is important to remark that the traditional way of modelling investor
behaviour such as modelling their preferences by CARA preferences cannot
account for these wealth e®ects. If there is a ¯nancial crises, and wealth
of the investor declines then they will increase demand of assets which are
negatively correlated with their wealth - this will reduce risk premia on the
4risky assets of other countries (ceteris paribus) and serve to limit the spread of
the crisis. This is however counterfactual to the evidence where risk premium
which can be measured by bond spreads increase in the event of a ¯nancial
crises.
There are several reasons why treating the investors as habit forming
can be justi¯ed in our context. Firstly, as noted above this speci¯cation
has been used to explain the equity premium puzzle in closed economies.
Thus, a similar speci¯cation should be used when understanding the asset
prices in an open economy context. This is a behavioral view. Secondly,
if we are to interpret the investors as large ¯nancial intermediaries or large
¯rms then a similar behavior may be generated. There are two di®erent
reasons for this. The ¯rst is that if we interpret `consumption' as payouts
to claimants (either depositors or shareholders) then ¯nancial intermediaries
will not want the payouts to drop below some level. The second is that if we
can interpret the `utility functions' as that of fund managers of the ¯nancial
intermediaries. If the fund managers' performance is evaluated relative to
some benchmark then a similar behavior will be generated. There can be
a third class of reasons why the behavior we postulate can be rationalized.
This has to do with portfolio insurance and risk management practices of
the large investors. Under portfolio insurance, the investors do not want the
value of the portfolio to fall below some level. In our model the investors do
not want the withdrawals from the portfolio (consumption in our model) to
fall below some threshold. The portfolio insurance models have the similar
property that as the prices of assets fall the allocation to them falls (see
Brennan and Schwartz (1988), and Grossman and Zhou (1996) for a general
equilibrium model with portfolio insurance). The close relationship between
the portfolio insurance and habit formation has already been noted in the
literature (see for example Campbell and Viceira (2002)). Thus, there can
be three entirely di®erent mechanisms through which the behavior of the
investors can be rationalized.
We elaborate on this behavioral approach in the context of a model of
speculative attacks with self-ful¯lling expectations built on Jeanne (1997)
and Masson (1999). Other than introducing these behavioral considerations
to the international ¯nance literature, the paper innovates in several ways.
First, it provides an explicit microeconomic foundation, based on an Interna-
tional Capital Asset Pricing Model (ICAPM), of the investors' behavior trig-
gering contagion. Second, the portfolio choices deriving from the investor's
optimizing behaviour add a further channel of contagion to the monsoonal
5and spillovers e®ects introduced by Masson (1999). Third, the model o®ers
a theory for the jumps between multiple equilibria based on the possible
wealth e®ects arising from the portfolio choice. Finally, the explicit mod-
elling of the risk premium required by the investor introduces an additional
source of nonlinearity in the multiple equilibria framework.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model
and Section 3 some policy implications. Section 4 concludes.
2 The model
This section presents a simple contagion model built on Jeanne (1997) and
Masson (1999). The main novelty consists in the formal representation of the
investor's behaviour as a mean to derive an explicit expression of the risk pre-
mium. In modelling the investor behavior we closely follow the speci¯cation
of Campbell and Cochrane (1989).
2.1 The investor's behaviour: Benchmark Case
There are M identical price-taking investors. The representative investor's
behaviour is grounded in the context of an International Consumption-based
Capital Asset Pricing Model (I-CAPM)1. By treating the valuation of emerg-
ing markets risky bonds through the I-CAPM, we implicitely assume that
the Fisher equation holds; that is, we assume that arbitrage on interest rates
will make the rate of return on bonds equal to that on equities, whereas the
riskiness of both kinds of assets is assumed to be of the same magnitude2.
The representative investor maximizes the period utility °ow, which in turn
depends on the consumption level. The intertemporal optimization makes
the investor smooth consumption over time by holding securities, which al-
low him to transfer purchasing power from one period to another. Financial
wealth will allow him to ¯nance consumption when income is low by selling
assets. However, as mentioned above, the speci¯cation of the preferences fol-
lows the external habit formation model of Campbell and Cochrane (1999).
At the ¯rst instance we study the investor behaviour in the benchmark case
without habit formation. In the benchmark case, the investor desires to hold
1The version used here follows Obste°d and Rogo® (1996), Ch. 5.
2See De La Grandville (2001), Ch. 2, for an arbitrage-based valuation of bonds.
6an asset if its return is expected to be high when consumption is expected to
be low. In the next section we change the model to cover habit formation.
The time horizon is in¯nite, there are N countries in the world, and each









where Et is the expectation operator which averages over all possible
future contingency plans for consumption and is conditioned on information
known on date t, ¯ is a constant subjective time-preference factor, u(¢) is
the period utility function, assumed to be twice continuously di®erentiable,
strictly increasing, and strictly concave, i.e. u0(¢) > 0, u00(¢) < 0, Cs is
consumption on period s.















s ) ¡ Cs (2)
where Bs is the net (dollar denominated) risk-free bond purchase at time s¡1,
xm;s is the fractional share of country m's security purchased by the agent
on period s ¡ 1, Dm
s denotes the date s market value in dollars of country
m's security, r¤
s is the net real interest rate, expressed in dollars, on the risk-
free bond Bs between period s ¡ 1 and s, and Y m
s is the dividend payed
on country m's security at time s. Equation (2) expresses the link between
period s's saving and period s + 1 ¯nancial wealth. One can think of Bs
as the United States Treasury bill net purchase, of Dm
s as the market value
of emerging country m's debt3, and of Y m
s as the coupon interest on debt.
We make explicit here that our interest concentrates on the international
transmission of an already occurred ¯nancial crisis rather than on its genesis
within a country. This quali¯cation allows us to assume that the supply of
risky bonds is ¯xed over time and normalized to one, and that a no-arbitrage
condition between risky assets of di®erent emerging countries holds, so that
the interest rates on emerging countries bonds are equal over countries when
risk is taken into account.
3Note that here Dm
s is a price while in Masson (1999) it denotes the debt amount.
7Maximizing the utility function (1) subject to the constraints (2) with





















Equation (3) states that in equilibrium the marginal utility cost of in-
vestment, given by the l.h.s., must be equal to the expected marginal utility
gain, given by the r.h.s.. Equation (4) is the stochastic Euler equation for







that is, the expected intertemporal marginal rate of substitution equals 1=(1+
r¤
s+1), the price of certain future consumption in terms of present consump-
tion.
Now, de¯ne the annual net returns r¤m
t on country m risky bond as the




























Dividing both sides by u0(Cs), using (4) to substitute out ¯Esu0(Cs+1)=u0(Cs),
















Equation4 (5) is the crucial expression of the consumption-based CAPM.
It says that the asset's risk premium, that is the expected excess return over
4In deriving it we have also used the fact that for any constant a0, Cov(X;Y + a0) =
Cov(X;Y ).
8the riskless bond, depends negatively on the covariance of the asset's rate
of return with the rate of growth of the marginal utility of consumption.
In other words, given the assumptions on the period utility function, the
risk premium depends positively on the covariance of the asset's return with
consumption level growth. If the covariance term is negative, the risk pre-
mium will be positive, meaning that the asset tends to yield unexpectedly
high returns in states of nature when the marginal utility of consumption
is unexpectedly low or, equivalently, when the level of consumption is high.
Therefore, the asset does not provide a hedge against consumption °uctua-
tions and the investor will require an expected return higher than the risk-free
bond's return to be persuaded to hold the asset.
Recall that Cov(x;y) = ¾(x)¾(y)½(x;y), where ¾(¢) denotes the standard


































where ´t = ¡Ctucc(Ct)=uc(Ct) denotes the local curvature of the utility func-
tion, and ¢ct+1 is the log-di®erence of consumption, or consumption growth.
The second relation is exact in continuous time5.
2.2 Habit formation
In order to obtain a link between the risk premium and the probability of de-
valuation of the currency under consideration, we specify utility as a function
of the investor's surplus of consumption with respect to an external habit, as
in Campbell and Cochrane (1999). That is, we substitute u(C) with u(C¡X)










5See Cochrane (2001), ch.1.
9De¯ne the surplus consumption ratio St ´ (Ct¡Xt)=Ct and let lowercase
letters denote the logs of uppercase letters, that is, for example, st = lnSt.
We assume that the logarithm of the surplus follows an AR(1) process:
st = (1 ¡ Á)s + Ást + ¸(st)(ct+1 ¡ ct ¡ g) (8)
where g is the systematic part of consumption growth, given by:
¢ct+1 = g + vt+1; vt+1 » i:i:d:N(0;¾
2).
The speci¯cation of st means that consumption is always greater than
habit, and we can let consumption a®ect habit di®erently in di®erent states
(see Campbell and Cochrane (1999), and Cochrane (2000)). In other words,
following Campbell and Cochrane (1999), we allow surplus-consumption ratio
to react slowly to changes in consumption. Furthermore, consumption a®ects
surplus di®erently in di®erent states, as implied by ¸(st). With habit in the

























; m = 1;:::;N:
(9)
Thus, it is clear that risk aversion is negatively related to surplus-consumption
ratio: a recession, by making consumption fall towards habit, will increase
the time-varying local curvature of utility function and, then, the risk pre-
mium required on the country m's asset.
2.3 Linkages through portfolio choice
As shown above, r¤m
t+1 is the net rate of return on dollar denominated bonds.
However, the international investor willing to purchase country m's bonds
must take into account devaluation expectations on the local currency6. If
6This approach is justi¯ed as we consider that a large part of the capital °ows to
developing countries in the nineties involved assets denominated in domestic currency,
exposing the external creditor to exchange rate risk, as documented by Ag¶ enor an Montiel
(1999, Ch. 15).
10Sm;t is today's spot exchange rate (price of foreign currency in terms of
domestic currency), and Sd
m;t+1 is its value next period if a devaluation has
occurred, then, for securities denominated in local currency the ex ante (ln)
return on the asset is7:
Et(r
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t+1 is the prob-
ability of a devaluation occurring, and ± is the extent of the expected deval-











t+1 denotes the risk premium required by the investor on country
m's asset.
Eq. (11) says that the investor will expect a rate of return on country
m 's asset equal to the sum of the rate of return on the risk-free bond, the
expected currency devaluation times the probability it will occur, and the
risk premium, in order to be persuaded to hold it.
The supply of bonds being ¯xed, a change in the rate of return required by
the M identical investors will result in an equivalent change in the equilibrium
rate of return through the market clearing condition.
Now consider that the representative international investor's dynamic
budget constraint can alternatively be written as in eq. (2) or as:
Wt+1 = (Wt ¡ Ct)(1 + r
¤w
t+1) (12)
where Wt denotes total wealth, (1 + r¤w
t+1) is de¯ned to be the simple gross
return on wealth invested from period t to period t + 1, and ¤ still denotes
dollar denominated returns. Given international portfolio diversi¯cation, the
gross return will be given by:
7The foreign exchange regime needs not to be ¯xed as the argument holds for a °oating
or managed regime as well.
8Eq. (8) is nothing more than an Uncovered Interest Parity (UIP) relation.
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where q¤;t+1 is the proportion of wealth invested in risk-free bond, and qm;t+1
is the proportion of wealth invested in country m's asset at time t, implying
that q¤;t+1 +
PN
m=1 qm;t+1 = 1.















We will use the log-linear approximation to the budget constraint pro-
posed by Campbell (1992) to relate unexpected changes in consumption to
changes in expectations about future returns.




t+1 + log(1 ¡ exp(ct ¡ wt)) (15)
Taking a ¯rst-order Taylor expansion around the mean (c ¡ w) of the
second term on the right hand side of (14) we get:
¢wt+1 ¼ r
¤w






(ct ¡ wt) (16)
where k = log(1¡exp(c¡w))+
exp(c¡w)








Next, consider the equality:
¢wt+1 = ¢ct+1 + (ct ¡ wt) ¡ (ct+1 ¡ wt+1) (17)
Equating the left hand sides of (15) and (16), solving the resulting dif-
ference equation in ct ¡ wt forward and taking expectations at time t we
obtain:










Finally, substitute out eq. (17) into (15) and (16) to obtain:












Recalling now that, by assumption, (Et+1 ¡ Et)¢ct+1+j = 0; for j =
1;:::;1, eq. (18) simpli¯es to:







As explained by Campbell (1992), eq. (19) indicates that an unexpected
increase (decrease) in consumption today must be determined by an unex-
pected change in return on wealth today, as shown by the ¯rst term in the
sum on the right hand side of the equation, or by news that future returns
will be higher (lower), as shown by the remaining terms in the sum.
Equation (19) provides the needed link between the risk premium and
the probability of devaluation of country m' currency. An increase in the
probability of devaluation of country m's currency will decrease the expected
return in the reference currency (the dollar, in our example) through eq.
(10), which in turn will decrease the expected return on total wealth Etr¤w
t+1,
as shown by eq. (14), eventually determining an unexpected decrease in
consumption growth, as implied by eq. (19); ¯nally, this recession process
will increase the excess return required by the investor through eq. (8) and
(11): Notably, the increase in the risk premium will involve all assets held by
the investor since the recession state will a®ect his risk attitude towards all
assets. Building on Masson (1999), we will specify now the process through
which the risk premium will in turn a®ect the probability of devaluation
providing a rationale for multiple equilibria outcomes. We will consider a
world composed only two emerging markets and an industrialized country.
The interest rate in the industrialized country r¤ is given. Da
t is the price
of the accumulated debt, and there are assumed to be no new net capital
°ows. Any current de¯cit (or surplus) is ¯nanced through changes in reserves
Ra
t. Shocks on the trade balance T a are the only source of uncertainty. If
the reserves fall below a certain level R
a
, then a devaluation by ± occurs.









































bt ´ Tt ¡ r
¤
tDt¡1 + Rt ¡ R;
® ´ ±Dt¡1;























It is clear from eq. (22) that, even at this stage, only taking into account
the portfolio management rules of a risk-averse investor, contagious currency
crises with self-ful¯lling expectations can arise; in fact, the devaluation prob-
ability of country a depends on itself and on the risk premium on country a
's asset, the latter depending, in turn, on the probability of devaluation of
country a's and countryb's currencies as discussed above.
Assuming that the innovation in variable bt, ²t ´ bt ¡ Át has a normal












Eq. (23) di®ers from the equivalent expression in Jeanne (1997) and
Masson (1999) for the central term of the F function argument as well as for
the composition of the parameter Áa
t+1.
14To give an intuitive idea of how the above model works, consider a repre-
sentative investor holding risky assets issued by two emerging-market coun-
tries as well as a risk-free asset issued by a developed country (USA is a
reasonable assumption). In keeping with the portfolio choice problems, the
investor will require a risk premium for the risky assets returns to hold them.
The risk premium is inversely related to unexpected changes in consump-
tion growth, which in turn depends on the devaluation probability of the
emerging-market currencies. Hence, an increase in the devaluation probabil-
ity of country A's currency will decrease the expected consumption of the
investor who will in turn ask for a higher risk premium for all the held assets,
including those of country B. This will increase the interest rate on country
B's assets thus worsening its fundamentals and raising the probability of
devaluation of its currency.
Such a model can provide a theoretical framework useful to explain some
of the empirical evidence reported in the introduction. For example, a com-
mercial bank holding claims 9 issued by a number of countries in the same
region (e.g. East Asia) may be hit by the devaluation of one of its debtors'
currency and see its ¯nancial wealth reduced. This may lead the bank to
reassess the risk premium required on the bonds issued by all the other
countries in the region only because it fears (but this fear not necessarily
has to correspond to the actual situation) that they may be less compet-
itive after the ¯rst country's devaluation. The spreading of the currency
crisis to the whole region is thus triggered by an investors' sentiment shift.
On the other hand, international investors holding a widely geographically
diversi¯ed portfolio can be induced to a reallocation of their wealth as it
is hit by a currency devalutaion, consistently with the strong correlation
of emerging markets sovereign spreads documented by Baig and Goldfajn
(2001). The same model can help explain why other ¯nancial crises did not
spread from the origin country, as it happened for Argentina in 2001-200210.
In that case, the sharp decline in the correlation between emerging markets
sovereign spreads can be the result of a previous reallocation of the interna-
tional investors' portfolios away from Argentine assets triggered by frequent
signals of instability over the months preceding December 2001, the conven-
tional starting date of the Argentine crisis. This shows how important is the
9We can think of corporate bonds.
10The lack of contagious e®ects from the Argentine crisis ha been documented, among
others, by the IMF (2002), and Boschi (2002).
15role of portfolio diversi¯cation in reducing the probability of contagion, as
suggested by our model.
2.4 Adding linkages through competitiveness e®ects
To allow for competitiveness e®ects, we assume that:
T
a














where RER is the logarithm of the real exchange rate, which gives a weight
wa on country b, and (1 ¡ wa) on the United States; ea¤
t and eab
t are the
logarithms of the nominal exchange rates vis-a-vis the US dollar and the
country b currency. That is:
ea¤
t = log(Sa¤
t ) = log(a0s currency=US$),
and eab
t = log(Sab
t ) = log(a0s currency=b0s currency):
Analogously, for country b:
RER
b
































From the expression above we note that a devaluation of country b's
currency vis-a-vis the US$ (that is, an increasing competitivity of country b
on the american market) decreases RERa
t, that is the general competitivity
of country a. We can refer to this link as to a competitiveness e®ect. Prices
are ¯xed: nominal devaluation produces an improvement in competitiveness.
The investor knows that with probability ¼b
t the country b will devalue
its currency, that is, with probability ¼b
t, eb¤
t+1 = eb¤
t + ± (we are assuming









Now the probability of devaluation in country a depends on the possibility
of devaluation in b ¼b





















































































t+1 = T + ¯(ea¤
t+1 ¡ waeb¤
t+1) ¡ r¤
t+1Dt + Rt+1 ¡ R. This equation
shows how contagion can occur because of trade competitiveness as well as
wealth e®ects. The speci¯cation of the two countries' trade balance as depen-
dent on the real exchange rate makes the devaluation expectations sensitive
to trade competitiveness. This framework can give a complete picture of how
contagion works. In fact, a portfolio e®ect, a competitiveness e®ect, or both
can increase the probability of devaluation in one country as a consequence
of the expected devaluation in another country. The link between the ex-
pectations of devaluation in the two countries is provided by the inclusion of
the risk premium, which in turn is endogeneized by using an International
Capital Asset Pricing (ICAPM) model, and by trade competitiveness on a
third market. Finally, the crisis can also be triggered simultaneously in the
two countries by a common global shock captured by the rate of interest of
a risk-free asset. The empirical evidence provided by Glick and Rose (1999),
according to which contagion tends to occur as a consequence of trade links
and competitiveness e®ects, is consistent with the theoretical model here
presented.
3 Stabilizing the system
A number of authors has invoked some sort of restrictions on capital mo-
bility in order to stabilize the international ¯nancial system. For example,
Krugman (1999) argues that countries which cannot adopt either currency
17unions or free °oating should limit capital °ows. Stiglitz (1999) endorses the
same view with special reference to developing countries. A di®erent mean
by which reducing macroeconomic instability was proposed by James Tobin
(1978), who argues that a foreign exchange transactions tax would help pre-
vent destabilizing speculation in international ¯nancial markets. This view
was broadly discussed in the aftermath of the frequent currency crises of
the 1990s. In this Section we analyze the e®ects of such restrictions on the
probability of transmission of crises in the context of our model.
3.1 Capital controls
As mentioned above, one way to stabilize international ¯nancial markets
could be by means of imposing restrictions on capital °ows. We model this
restriction introducing a no-short-selling constraint on risky bonds:
xm;s ¸ 0 (27)















where vm;s+1 is the Lagrange multiplier associated with constraint (22) at
time s+1. The term vm;s+1 is equal to the increase in expected lifetime utility
that would result if the current constraint were relaxed by one unit. Going
through the steps discussed in Subsection 2.1 again, leads to the following
expression for the risk premium under capital control:
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t+1, country a's probability of devaluation will thus be lowered by
a decrease in the argument of the F function. In fact, the new expression for
the \fundamentals" variable is:
18bt ´ Tt ¡ [r
¤
t ¡ qa;t+1£
a]Dt¡1 + Rt ¡ R









Intuitively, capital controls will decrease the probability of devaluation,
and thus of contagion, by means of a decrease in the expected returns on
developing countries' securities.
3.2 Tobin tax
In this Subsection, we apply the above model to answer the following ques-
tion: does a Tobin tax, i.e. a foreign exchange transactions tax, reduce the
probability of contagion of ¯nancial crises?
Remembering that the budget constraint is expressed in dollars, the intro-
duction of a tax with rate ¿m on each foreign exchange transactions modi¯es
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s+1 is the rate of return on country m's security under taxation,
which is equal to the rate of return without taxation. In other words, the
introduction of a tax on foreign exchange transactions does not change the
equilibrium behaviour of the representative investor, thus leaving unchanged
the probability of transmission of crises.
194 Conclusion
The existing literature on contagion presents an unsatisfactory partition of
the phenomenon explanations between theories based on fundamentals and
theories based on the investors' behaviour. The model presented in this pa-
per nests both the main sources of contagion of ¯nancial crises, adds another
dimension of non-linearity to the Jeanne-Masson model increasing the like-
lihood of self-ful¯lling equilibria, and o®ers a theory of how jumps between
multiple equilibria may occur through wealth e®ects. It shows that ¯nancial
crises can be transmitted across seemingly unrelated countries (e.g. Rus-
sia and Brazil) through the risk attitudes of international investors. Thus,
to understand ¯nancial crises it is not su±cient to look at the countries in
question, but also at the portfolios of international investors. International
business cycle considerations through the wealth e®ects can also play a role in
the incidence of ¯nancial crises. The model also suggests that bond spreads,
in the event of a ¯nancial crisis, would change in emerging markets depending
on the pattern of portfolio holdings of international investors. Better risk-
management can help reduce the incidence of ¯nancial crises. The model
can help better understand the transmission of crises across markets which
do not seem to be directly related to each other by emphasizing the role of
capital °ows and thus, integrating international trade and ¯nance consid-
erations. Finally, an extension of the model to introduce a no-short-selling
constraint shows that frictions in the international capital °ows can help re-
duce the instability originating from the self ful¯lling expectations of rational
investors.
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